The release of the September 11 Commission Report was intended to provide clarity and closure on one of the most significant events in modern American history. However, as William Raspberry articulated on July 26, 2004, the report had its shortcomings that cannot be overlooked. This article delves into these failures to better understand the gaps in the commission's findings and recommendations.
The Background of the September 11 Commission Report
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, more commonly referred to as the 9/11 Commission, was established to prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the September 11 attacks. While its intentions were noble, the execution left room for critique. Critics like Raspberry noted that the report often provided broad strokes rather than diving deep into critical details.
Lack of Concrete Recommendations
One of the primary criticisms leveled at the commission was its failure to offer specific, actionable recommendations that could effectively prevent future terrorist attacks. While the report contained warnings about potential misuse of intelligence, it was perceived as vague in suggesting detailed measures for intelligence reform or improved security protocols.
Overlooked Intelligence Warnings
Another major flaw was the commission’s handling of pre-9/11 intelligence. Information indicating that attacks were imminent was downplayed or ignored, a failure that is discussed in William Raspberry's critique. The report often minimized these missed signals, which, if acted upon, might have mitigated the disaster.
The Report’s Limited Impact on Policy
Despite the intentions behind its publication, the September 11 Commission Report's influence on subsequent U.S. policy remains a point of contention. With the absence of forceful recommendations, the report had a diluted impact on legislative changes, which were crucial to strengthening national security.
Need for Ongoing Security Reforms
The commission called for a broad restructuring of intelligence agencies but fell short of specifying how to implement these changes effectively. As a result, many critics argue that the report served as more of a historical document than a catalyst for reform.